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THE INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENTS   
IN THE POLISH EURO 2012 HOST CITIES   
Introduction 
The most significant value added by Euro 2012 is undoubtedly the 
infrastructural changes. The event became a catalyst for the execution of more 
than two hundred projects for an amount of ca. PLN 100 billion. This paper 
focuses on the key projects, including above all the road construction projects, 
as well as those connected to road and rail infrastructure. 
Considering such significant outlays, the funding the preparation, 
particularly in a division into private and public sources, becomes an especially 
important issue. It is the predominant commitment of public funds that creates 
the need to justify their allocation, chiefly in the case of the sports venues, usually 
utilised by private sports clubs after the end of the event. Euro 2012 has been 
compared in this respect with other events of this rank, staged in Europe since the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
The model of financing of Euro 2012 in Poland and in other UEFA 
European Championships hosts – comparative analysis 
Poland's participation in the organisation of UEFA European Championships 
in 2012 is a pretext to attempt to determine whether the commitment of public 
funds in such major events is justified. The issue of financing mega sports 
events has been the subject of comprehensive analyses presented in foreign 
literature. For obvious reasons, this subject has not yet been taken up in Poland, 
although both Euro 2012 and any potential mega sports events that may be 
organised in future, given the present infrastructure, have contributed to a 
change in this trend.  
Table 3.1 contains an overall comparison of the expenses incurred in the 
framework of preparations for UEFA European Championships organised in 
2000–2012. In terms of the structure of financing, two models can be identified: 
public and private. In nearly all countries private funds have been committed, 
with the exception of Poland, where the outlays were financed exclusively from 
public sources. It was in spite of huge hopes placed in public-private partnership 
[Zawadzki, 2010, pp. 606–616].  
The fact of financing from a single source compounds the massive size of the 
outlays. In this respect the event in Poland was among the most expensive ones. 
Its total cost was in excess of 22.5 billion EUR2012.
1
 This is at odds with the 
assumption presented in the subchapter 2.3 that the most expensive events 
necessitate funding from a variety of both public and private sources. For 
comparison, the co-organiser of UEFA Euro 2012 – Ukraine spent less than a 
sixth of that amount on preparations for the event. Among the cheapest were the 
tournaments organised at the turn of the century in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The overall amount allocated to the preparations in both countries was less than 
half a billion EUR2012. The tournament organised in Austria and Switzerland 
should also be considered cheap. It cost each of the countries around half a billion 
EUR2012. This confirms the hypothesis of lower infrastructure expenditures in 
countries with more developed economies. During UEFA Euro in 2000 and 
2008 the event hosts, being some of the most developed European countries, 
focused on preparing the stadiums and their immediate surroundings. In Poland, 
Portugal and Ukraine organisation of such a major sporting event became an 
excuse for execution of a series of infrastructural projects related to sports 
venues only to a small extent.  
Table 1. 
Size and structure of financing of UEFA European Championships, broken down into 
public and private sources 
 
Place and time 
Financing 
[EUR2012bn] 
 Participation In funding 
[%] 
public private total public private 
Belgium 2000 0.09 0.103 0.193   47 53 
The Netherlands 2000 0.078 0.202 0.280   28 72 
Portugal 2004 3.4 0.6 4.0   85 15 
                                         
1 The EUR2012 unit was used to reflect as accurately as possible the expenditures incurred by the 
individual countries [Zawadzki, 2013, pp. 613–615]. 
Austria 2008 0.4045 0.023 0.4275   95   5 
Switzerland 2008 0.303 0.230 0.533   57 43 
Poland 2012 22.503 0 22.503 100   0 
Ukraine 2012 2.97 0.72 3.69   80 20 
 
Source: [Zawadzki, 2013a, p. 615]. 
 
Although the stadiums were among the most important projects completed in 
Poland as part of Euro 2012, they accounted for a relatively small part of the 
total expenditure on key investments – under 6% (Table 3.2). Non-sports 
infrastructure was of a far greater significance here, above all, road 
infrastructure, which accounted for more than 80% of the outlays. 
Since the execution of a great proportion of infrastructure projects in 
countries with less developed economies is accelerated due to the event but the 
projects would be completed in the future regardless, it is difficult to compare 
the cases of the individual host countries in terms of overall expenditures made 
in connection of UEFA Euro tournaments. As shown in Table 3.1, the scale of 
variance is enormous. The “most expensive” UEFA European Championships in 
Poland ate up more than 116 times funds than the “cheapest” ones in Belgium. 
But to determine the actual scale of financing of an event it would be necessary 
to isolate only the projects executed exclusively for UEFA Euro and disregard 
the ones for which the event was only a catalyst. 
 
Table 2.  
Expenditure on key investments as part of preparations for Euro 2012 in Poland  
 
place 
stadium 
infrastruct
ure 
road 
transport 
rail 
transport 
air  
transport 
public 
transport 
other 
infrastructu
re 
Gdańsk 921.21 1 569.15 0 306.60 0 19 
Poznań 638.58 151.83 0 222.50 0 0 
Warsaw 1 914.63 0 0 0 0 84 
Wrocław 857.42 890.24 0 503.25 760 0 
entire state 0 60 003.80 8 042.70 206.69 0 0 
Total 
million 
PLN 
4 331.84 62 615.03 8 042.70 1 239.04 760 103 
% 5.62 81.22 10.43 1.61 0.99 0.13 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on: Sprawozdanie z realizacji przedsięwzięć Euro 
2012 oraz z wykonanych działań dotyczących realizacji przygotowań Polski do finałowego 
turnieju Mistrzostw Europy w Piłce Nożnej UEFA Euro 2012 (styczeń 2012 – czerwiec 
2012), Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Warsaw 2012 pp.24-42. 
 
Therefore, western specialist literature usually refers to the expenses 
incurred solely with the purpose of preparing the sports venues [Feddersen et al., 
2008]. Opponents of this approach invariably point to the fact that highly 
developed countries usually already have the necessary stadiums and are not 
forced to build them from scratch. Moreover, the construction of an arena 
generally increases the competitiveness of a particular region after the event, so 
the expenses incurred during its creation will be offset by potential income from 
its operation. Despite the aforementioned reservations, such an approach seems 
far more reliable than a comprehensive approach, taking into consideration 
multiple road, rail or air infrastructure projects. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
focusing exclusively on the financing of sports venues greatly reduces the scale 
of financing. The most substantial expenditures, incurred by Ukraine, amount to 
1,093 billion EUR2012. It also reduces the difference between the “most 
expensive” and “cheapest” event. A comparison of the expenses incurred by the 
individual countries as part of the same (co-organisers) and different events 
gives rise to some interesting conclusions.  
The event in Ukraine, although generating the largest expenditures, is not 
regarded as the most expensive in view of the high share (over 40%) of funds 
from private sources for the construction of the Donetsk and Kharkov. These 
venues were prepared efficiently and without any serious disruptions and were 
put in operation as early as in 2009. However, the execution of the stadiums for 
public funds was far from trouble-free. As a result of the increasing costs and 
repeated postponement of completion dates, the Olympic Stadium in Kiev was 
completed in mid-2011, and the venue in Lvov was not ready until November 
2011, following a decisive intervention of the Ukrainian government and public 
prosecutor's office. 
 
 Figure 1. Scale and structure of financing of sports venues in the framework of UEFA 
Euro in 2000–2012 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
 
The venues in Poland, wholly financed from public sources, have given rise 
to much controversy and social discontent. Opponents of such a model of 
funding often argue that that the venues are now being used by sports clubs 
owned by private investors. This applies to the stadiums in Gdańsk, Poznań and 
Wrocław. 
It is noteworthy that the outlays made by Poland and Ukraine are far higher 
than those incurred by Portugal despite the relatively similar level of economic  
development and the fact that the Iberian country prepared ten stadiums, 
including six funded from public sources, for an amount of 0,441 billion 
EUR2012 (all ten for 0,8 billion EUR2012). This might indicate a steady increase in 
the cost of sports venue construction, whose dynamics exceeds the HICP index 
level assumed in the calculations of the EUR2012 unit. 
To sum up the aspect of financing the stadium infrastructure outlays, there is 
a striking contrast between the wealthier countries, allocating relatively modest 
funds to this purpose, usually upgrading existing venues, and the poorer 
countries, not having the required infrastructure base and forced to build sports 
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venues from scratch. The issue of the structure of financing is more ambiguous, 
although, with the exception of Austria, it may be ventured that better developed 
countries are more willing to use private sources, whereas public and mixed 
sources dominate in less economically developed countries.  
It would be difficult to judge at this stage whether such a high share of public 
funding was justified in the case of Poland. A matter of great importance will be 
the utilisation of existing infrastructure, including the stadiums which, if 
managed inefficiently, will continue to be a burden to the cities' budgets in the 
future. This issue is described in more detail in chapter four. 
Degree of completion of the projects undertaken as part of 
preparations for Euro 2012 
The fact of entrusting organisation of one of the world’s largest sport events 
to Poland gave rise to the natural questions as to whether our country would be 
ready to take up such a multifront challenge. Particular anxiety accompanied the 
condition of the infrastructure and the scale of the necessary actions to improve 
it. The only elements which appeared to be of decent quality were: the hotel 
infrastructure, the quantitative coverage of the Polish railway network, and the 
urban transport. All other areas required immense investments almost 
revolutionary in nature. Some economists formulated a risky, though not 
unsubstantiated thesis, that given its actual infrastructure of the year 2007 
Poland would not have stood any chance organise the Euro efficiently even as 
early as in 1980 [Zawadzki, 2013b, p. 53].  
Hence, the paramount challenge the organisers faced was to carry out the 
necessary infrastructural projects. As mentioned in the subchapter 1.3, the 
number of the investments planned totalled 219. The immense scale of the 
investment-related works was evident to the legislator as early as at the stage of 
creating the legal framework, and the scenario of a possible failure to carry 
through the daring plans was realised. Therefore, the projects were arranged in 
three groups depending on their perceived weight. The key investments grouped 
the initiatives considered paramount in importance and indispensible for 
efficient organisation of the Euro 2012. This group includes projects connected 
with: 
 stadiums, 
 road infrastructure, 
 air transport, 
 rail transport, 
 public transport. 
Among the important projects were also those connected with medical care, 
while other projects also included hotel infrastructure and the preparation of 
team base camps. 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the projects grouped by their designations. 
Apart from the four host cities, the projects embraced the entire country. This 
means, they were investments carried out over large areas, basically improving 
the transport infrastructure all over Poland. The largest group named “other 
cities” refers primarily to the accommodation centres dispersed all over the 
country, prepared to receive the national teams. Table 3.3 reveals that out of the 
four host cities Wrocław was the location of most key and important projects 
planned. However, with all other investments taken into account Gdańsk takes 
the lead with its 34 projects in total. 
  
 Table 3.  
Number of projects implemented in preparation for the Euro 2012 in Poland,  
grouped by area  
 
Area 
Project type 
Total 
Key Important Other 
Gdańsk   7   5   22   34 
Poznań   5 11   13   29 
Warsaw   4   7     8   19 
Wrocław 11   6   11   28 
Other cities   0   0   69   69 
Poland 19   8   13   40 
Total 46 37 136 219 
 
Source: the author’s own study.  
As of day one, it was assumed that the percent of unrealised projects would 
be inversely proportional to the weight ascribed to them. In practice, it turned 
out that not only some of the ‘other’ projects, but also not all of the undertaken 
investments of the ‘key’ and ‘important’ status had been completed by the 
opening of the European Championship. Table 3.4 shows the degree of project`s 
attainment expressed in figures and percentages. The category of investments 
unfinished on time includes projects ultimately completed by the end of the year 
2012. There were 13 projects brought to completion after their original deadline, 
including 2 of the key status, and 6 classified as important. In table 3.4, the 
number of those investments is shown in brackets.  
 
Table 4.  
Degree of project attainment by day one of the Euro 2012 
 
Area 
Project type 
Key Important Other 
Total 
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Gdańsk   6 1 86% 4 1 80% 15 7 (1) 68% 74% 
Poznań   4 1 80% 6 5 (1) 55%   9 4 (2) 69% 66% 
Warsaw   3 1 75% 6 1 (1) 86%   3 5 38% 63% 
Wrocław 10 1 91% 5 1 83%   4   36% 68% 
Other cities - - - - - - 32 37 (1) 46% 46% 
Poland  12 7 (2) 63% 3 5 (4) 38%  7 6 (1) 54% 55% 
Total 35 11 (2) 76% 24 13 (6) 65% 70 66 (5) 51% 59% 
 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
On the whole, however, the anticipation that the degree of project attainment 
would be proportional to the status ascribed to the specific projects has proven 
true. We have managed to complete more than ¾ of the planned key projects, 
but not much more than half of all other initiatives. Ultimately, 59 per cent of 
the planned projects were completed on time. Looking at the host cities alone, 
Gdańsk performed best with 74 per cent of its planned initiatives completed 
before day one of the Euro event. On the other hand, from the perspective of the 
key and important projects alone, Wrocław proved more effective with its 
respective 91 and 83 per cent plan attainment. 
Figure 2. The degree of attainment of individual projects related to the Euro 2012 by 
the type of the infrastructural investment 
Source: the author’s own study. 
 
When analysing the degree of project attainment against the criterion of the 
type of the infrastructural one should note cases of 100 per cent plan execution 
in the categories of key and important projects. These are found in such areas as 
stadium infrastructure, air transport, urban transport, and projects connected 
with medical care and safety. Moreover, the degree of advancement into key and 
important projects, if only undertaken, never fell below 55 per cent. The top 
position in this ranking belongs to the air transport-related infrastructure, where 
the key and important projects were fully completed. The outcomes were worst, 
as could be expected, in the case of other projects. In none of the analysed areas 
was the plan fully executed, and the worst situation was noted for the railway 
infrastructure, where the attainment stopped at the mere 14 per cent (Figure 3.2).  
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Major infrastructure changes occurring in Polish host cities in 
connection with the staging of Euro 2012 
Air transport 
Predictably, air transport played a crucial role in the tourist traffic to and 
from Poland. According to representatives of the airports in the four host cities, 
more than 10 000 take-offs and landings took place during the group phase and 
quarterfinals (Figure 3.3). An overwhelming proportion of these were foreign 
flights, accounting for more than 82 per cent of all air traffic. 
 
 
Figure 3. Use of the airports in the four host cities during Euro 2012 
 
Source: own compilation based on the data received from the administrators of Warsaw 
Chopin Airport, Gdansk Lech Walesa Airport, Wroclaw Airport, Poznan Airport. 
 
Such performance could not have been achieved without the extension of all 
the aforementioned airports, aimed at increasing their capacity and streamlining 
the handling of arriving and departing passengers (Table 3.5). 
In addition to the efforts aimed at adjusting the capacity of the Polish airports 
to temporarily increased air traffic during the event, another objective of equal 
importance was to meet top safety standards and ensure minimum delays for 
traffic other than connected with Euro 2012. Achievement of these aims was 
also facilitated by the introduction of new procedures – IAP, STAR and SID – 
for the individual airports. 
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Table 5. 
 Effects of the expansion of airports in host cities 
 
City 
Before/after 
upgrading 
Capacity Operations 
Number  
of passengers 
arriving/hour 
Number of 
passengers 
departing/hour 
Number of  
operations/hour 
Gdańsk 
Before upgrading   760   760 23 
After upgrading 2240 2240 23 
Poznań 
Before upgrading   900   500 10 
After upgrading 1900 1100 20 
Warsaw 
Before upgrading 3750 2340 36 
After upgrading 5860 3660 38 
Wrocław 
Before upgrading 1260   840 10 
After upgrading 2240 2240 22 
 
Source: own compilation based on the data received from the administrators of Warsaw 
Chopin Airport, Gdansk Lech Walesa Airport, Wroclaw Airport, Poznan Airport. 
 
Rail transport 
During the preparations for Euro 2012, a number of projects were carried out 
on the rail network, with the aim of reducing the time of journey between the 
host cities and from border crossings to the host cities (Table 3.6). In the latter 
case the modernisation related to the links on two routes: Terespol – Warsaw 
and Zgorzelec – Wrocław The longest journey is that between Gdańsk and 
Wrocław. It is noteworthy that before the upgrading the journey time on the 
same route was around 8 hours. 
Table 6. 
Time of train journey between host cities and from border crossings to host cities  
[in hours] 
 
 Gdańsk Poznań Terespol Warsaw Wrocław Zgorzelec 
Gdańsk X 06:20 - 04:40   
Poznań 03:30 X - 02:40 02:30 - 
Terespol - - X 02:37 - - 
Warsaw 04:40 02:40 02:37 X 04:45 - 
Wrocław 06:20 02:30 - 04:45 X 01:59 
Zgorzelec - - - - 01:59 X 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Beside the track upgrading, the goal was also achieved thanks to the new 
rolling stock. It consisted of 29 Elf electric multiple units and 10 Newag electric 
multiple units. In addition, 21 new train engines were added to the resources of 
Polish State Railways. 
An important element of improvement of Poland's image were investments 
involving certain elements of rail infrastructure. These included, in particular:  
 railway stations:  
 Warszawa Centralna, 
 Warszawa Wschodnia, 
 Wrocław Główny, 
 Poznań Główny; 
 railway stops:  
 Warszawa Stadion, 
 Gdańsk Stadion Expo, 
 Wrocław Stadion.  
 
Road infrastructure 
The amounts spent on this element of infrastructure were by far the most 
substantial. The data quoted at the beginning of this chapter show that the 
outlays on roads are greater than the total of all other infrastructure projects. 
Among the most important road infrastructure undertakings carried out as part 
of the preparations for Euro 2012 are the expressways, including motorways and 
ring roads. They contributed to reduced journey times, sometimes by as much as 
several hours; for example, A2 motorway with S8 expressway reduced the time 
of journey from Berlin to Warsaw from seven hours to four and a half hours. 
Furthermore, the investments improved the safety on Polish roads. 
Since 2007, the number of kilometres of completed roads has increased 
radically (Figure 3.4). Particular acceleration of this process was observed in 
2012, when nearly 1000 kilometres of expressways were put in operation in 
Poland. This is an unprecedented case in our country. It may be worth 
comparing this number with the total length of all expressways in Poland put in 
operation until and including 2011. There were 1738 kilometres of such roads, 
which is only 82% more than in 2012 alone. Meanwhile, from 2008 to the end 
of 2012 the motorway network was extended by 885 kilometres, and other 
expressway network – by 812 kilometres. Compared with the situation as of the 
end of 2007, there was a 171% increase in length. It was largely due to the 
organisation of UEFA European Championships. In this context, the Euro effect 
will continue to be discernible for a few more years. This is because of the roads 
whose construction began before the tournament, but was not completed before 
the end of 2012. General Directorate for National Roads and Motorways 
(GDDKiA) plans to put in operation an additional 64 kilometres of motorways 
and 300 kilometres of other expressways in 2013-2014 in the aftermath of Euro 
2012 in Poland. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Development of the road network in Poland in 2008-2012 [km] 
Source: own compilation based on GDDKiA data. 
 
Final remarks 
 
In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the impact of the organisation 
of UEFA European Championships on the host cities: Gdańsk, Poznań, Warsaw 
and Wrocław. The adopted list of infrastructural undertakings executed as part 
of Euro 2012 preparations included 219 projects divided according to the 
urgency criterion into key, important and other projects. Analysis of project 
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completion revealed that not all tasks had been executed as planned before the 
beginning of the event. Predictably, the key projects were found to have been 
completed in the greatest percentage of the cases (76%), while other projects 
were characterised by the lowest percentage of completion (51%). The degree of 
completion also varied between the individual cities. Gdańsk turned out to be 
the most efficient city with 74% of all projects completed, while Warsaw was at 
the bottom of the ranking with 63% of completed projects.  
Even considering the high percentage of incomplete infrastructural projects, 
it is worth emphasising that Euro 2012 became a catalyst of important changes, 
especially with respect to broadly defined transport infrastructure. It is 
particularly striking in the case of road infrastructure. In 2012 alone 953 
kilometres of expressways were completed. For comparison, by 2011 only 
slightly over 1700 kilometres of such roads had been built. What is important, 
the effects of Euro 2012 will still be noticeable at least until the end of 2014, 
when all projects undertaken in connection with the event will have been 
completed. 
Such considerable infrastructural needs of Poland necessitated massive 
outlays. Euro 2012 proved to be the most expensive of the UEFA European 
Championships organised in the 21st century and, in all likelihood, in the whole 
history of the tournament. A highly disadvantageous fact for our country was the 
complete absence of commitment of private funds in the financing of the 
preparations. The public-private partnership program, in which high hopes had 
been placed in connection with the organisation of Euro 2012, turned out to be a 
total failure. It is noteworthy that it is an unprecedented case of financing a 
sporting event of this type exclusively from public sources. 
The most frequently recognised legacy of the Championships are the 
stadiums. The future management of these venues will have an influence on the 
general cost-benefit ratio of their construction/extension. The difficulties in 
generating sufficient revenues to cover the costs of maintenance and debt 
service are already being experienced. The study indicated some feasible ways 
of fund acquisition involving the organisation of both sporting and non-sporting 
events. 
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